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ABSTRACT

The Society of United Irishmen was one of many radical political
clubs founded across the British Isles in the wake of the American and
French Revolutions. First established as a reformist organization, its
members sought to promote gradual changes in the political and social
structures of Ireland. However, the ideological radicalization of the
Society's leaders and the active suppression of openly reformist
political activity by the Anglo-Irish government, drove the Society
underground and transformed the United Irishmen into a close-knit
military coalition of Protestants and Catholics ready to fight for the
revolutionary cause of Irish independence.
As the culmination of nearly a decade of planning and careful
negotiations with the French Directory for assistance, the Rebellion of
1798 was a great disappointment to the United Irishmen. Although it was
intended to be a great revolutionary upheaval of anti-British sentiment
in Ireland,
the Rebellion was little more than a series of isolated
peasant insurrections across the Irish countryside. The Irish rebels
were an unprepared, ill-equipped, and poorly trained match for the
combined forces of the Anglo-Irish governments. With little real
assistance from the French, they were defeated quickly by their British
rivals. Although some political and social reforms followed, Ireland
retained its "dominion status."
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THE SOCIETY OF UNITED IRISHMEN AND THE REBELLION OF 1798

CHAPTER I
The Setting

As one of the most visible events in the complex process of social
and political transformation that swept Europe in the final decades of
the eighteenth century, the French Revolution, like its predecessor, the
American Revolution, was a model worthy of emulation for a whole
generation of would-be reformers and political radicals across the vast
continent of Europe.
/

/

Fuelled with the revolutionary ideals of
/

"liberte, egalite, fr a t e r m t e " and hopeful of financial and
military assistance from the French "mother-land," these political
radicals pushed forward with their long-held grievances and challenged
the ancient, yet delicate balance of monarchical Europe.
Ireland was one of the many places ignited by the fervor of foreign
revolution.

Like so many other small European states, Ireland was

subsumed by a vast monarchical-parliamentary empire that dictated the
political status and the socio-economic conditions of its people.

To the

Irish, America was a source of inspiration, while France offered them the
possibilities of ideological guidance, financial sustenance, and military
aid.

The birth of modern Irish republicanism stemmed from an unwavering

faith in the public actions and political ideologies of such
revolutionary nations.

The increasing radicalization of the Irish
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population resulted in a social and political crisis during the 1790s
that "followed a similar pattern to that of many other countries with
sizable revolutionary groups looking to France (and America) for support
and inspiration."1
While the Irish republican movement of the 1790s may have
represented a "general" European response to the French

and American

Revolutions, the events and the final outcome of the Irish rebellion of
1798 were unique.

In continental nations such as Poland or Belgium the

radical minority encompassed only a small segment of the total
population.

For these nations, a successful revolt depended largely upon

French military intervention.
rule.

Ireland was one exception to the general

The Irish revolutionary movement was led by the Society of United

Irishmen, a republican political society headed by an elite group of
Protestant radicals who were actively supported by a majority, pro-French
and pro-American, Catholic population.2

Although they were ultimately

unsuccessful in their attempts at revolution, the United Irishmen not
only rebelled with mass support, they also gained financial and military
assistance from the French.
In the late eighteenth century, Ireland was an island colony whose
social structure was marked by internal class divisions and political
barriers.

Great contrasts between wealth and poverty and between

privilege and discrimination separated vast segments of Ireland's
population from one another.

With an already large and ever-increasing

population, social tensions worsened and the existing gaps between Irish
social classes widened.

In just the years between 1750 and 1800

Ireland's population grew by almost fifty percent.

While in 1767 there
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were approximately two and a half million Irishmen, by 1800 there were
close to four and three-quarter million— a number that accounted for
almost one-third of the total population of the British Isles.
Naturally, such rapid growth placed considerable pressure upon Ireland's
social and political structures.3
Despite the increases in population, class distribution remained
unequal.

The Irish social structure was pyramidal in shape with a very

broad base that narrowed to a sharp point on the top.
divided into three distinct socio-economic classes.

Irishmen were
There was little

social mobility or interaction between the various groups.

The rights of

political power and land ownership were reserved largely for an elite
class of Anglo-Irish referred to as "the ascendancy.”

While this

centuries-old Anglican aristocracy made up approximately one-tenth of the
total population, they owned nearly five-sixths of the land, occupied
most government positions, and controlled the Irish Parliament in Dublin.
In Ireland, land ownership meant political power and social status for a
small number of privileged "gentlemen."4
Ireland's version of a middle-class encompassed a wide range of
incomes and occupations.

While most men were Protestant businessmen or

merchants (particularly the Presbyterian merchants and linen
manufacturers of Ulster and Dublin)r lawyers, doctors, and other
professionals were also included in this category, as were some
well-to-do farmers.

Although this group reflected a great diversity of

interests and talents, many were enlightened men of considerable
education and some wealth.

Perhaps more importantly, these men stood

mid-way between the great extremes of Irish wealth and poverty.

While
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they were only second-hand witnesses to the injustices suffered by
Ireland's peasants, they themselves endured the economic and political
discrimination of Ireland's ruling agrarian elite.

Therefore, it is not

surprising that these men formed the bulk of Ireland's radical leaders
and were the first to call for reform and ultimately revolt.3
The Roman Catholics made up the remaining three-quarters of
Ireland's population.

As the members of a "conquered" race, and

"speaking a language that was despised, professing a religion that was
abhorred," these Irish natives "found themselves in many cases slaves,
even in the bosom of written liberty."6

Although these three million

people formed the mass of Ireland's population, they were regarded as
strangers to the dominant Anglo society.

They had few civil or criminal

rights, were legally barred from holding public office, and were largely
relegated to lowly careers as artisans, cotters, and laborers.

Irish

uprisings during the American Revolution resulted in certain political
concessions from the Anglo-Irish government that included a law that
permitted Catholics to own their own land.

Unfortunately, increasing

land values meant that very few men could afford to take full advantage
of this privilege.

Instead, the overwhelming majority of Ireland's Roman

Catholics lived as impoverished peasants.7
While legal restrictions barred Irish Catholics from most forms of
active public participation in their society, social conditions deprived
them of high economic status.

As peasants, they were usually subject to

the eccentricities of an Anglo-Irish landlord, who all too often behaved
as "a sort of despot who yielded obedience. . .to no law but that of his
will."8

Isolated from his tenants by differences in language, religion.
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and national allegiance, the landlord saw his estate only as a lucrative
source of income.

Such mercenary attitudes placed added economic

pressures upon tenet farmers.9

Besides the inherent economic

uncertainties associated with a dependency upon agricultural production,
Ireland's rural masses were also burdened by a sharp rise in tithe rates
and rent levels and increased governmental duties on leather, whiskey,
beer, and tobacco from the mid 1780s until 1797.

For the average

peasant, the combination of these factors meant little if any surplus
cash each year and only aggravated his already chronic state of
poverty.10
Ireland's peasants knew few, if any, material comforts.

Accustomed

to squalid and unsanitary living conditions, even the clothes they wore
were generally ragged.

Poverty created a clothing shortage in Ireland

that was remedied with second-hand imports.

While this was a source of

inexpensive clothing, such dirty imports also brought various diseases
into Ireland.11

Housing conditions were no better.

Most Catholics

resided in small one-room dwellings or cabins that often housed more than
one family.

The traveller Arthur Young referred to such structures as:

"the most miserable looking hovels that can well be conceived."12

These

buildings generally consisted of mud walls, thatched roofs, a single
chimney, and one door to allow for the circulation of some light and air
to the interior.
such dwellings.

Starkly furnished, even beds were rare commodities in
Instead, in most cases "the family lay on straw, equally

partook of by cows, calves, and pigs."13
As a colony of England, it is no surprise that Ireland's social and
economic development lagged behind that of her European neighbors.
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Ireland remained overwhelmingly dependent upon traditional techniques of
production.

The existing linen industry still operated on a cottage

basis.with flax being woven in the homes of peasants on an intermittent
basis.14

Most importantly, Irelands*s colonial economy was only one

piece of the larger British mercantilist system.

As a result, protective

legislation was placed upon those goods (such as linen and wool) that
would best supply the ever-expanding British economy.13

For Ireland

this meant that she "was not allowed to trade directly with any other
nation, but was forced to receive her supplies and necessities of life
directly from Great Britain, so that the English people could alone be
the recipients of all profits."16
When compared to the industrial progress made by many other European
nations, Ireland was economically primitive.

The prevalence of small

farms made it difficult to apply the latest agricultural technologies.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of absentee landlords made room for an
exploitive group of middlemen in Ireland.

Concerned only with profit,

these men would lease large amounts of land directly from the landlord
and subsequently sub-let it to peasants at extraordinarily high rents.
As a result, the general lack of capital among peasants worsened and the
absence of any merchant or middle class in the Irish countryside meant
that peasants had little incentive to change.17

Even Ireland's leading

industries of brewing, distilling, linen, and wool manufacture were based
upon agricultural products.

Although economic output was increasing in

the late eighteenth century to meet the needs of a growing population,
Ireland remained largely a country of poor and uneducated peasants.18
Many of Ireland's more fortunate men recognized the economic and social
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backwardness of their nation and knew that it must be corrected soon.
With shame for Ireland and scorn for England, these men readily admitted
that economic opportunities were few and "the lower order of the people"
of their land had "less means of being enlightened than the same class of
people in any other country."19
It is not surprising that Ireland's governing structure virtually
mirrored the actions and intentions of the dominant British system based
in London.

After all, as a colony inhabited by a majority population of

disenfranchised Roman Catholics, it was vitally important for the English
to remain firmly in control.

Only the outcries of the Irish for

political freedom and their accompanying threats of violence during the
American Revolution prompted the passage of the Constitution of 1782,
which granted the Irish government greater legislative and judicial
independence from England.

While this document bestowed great privilege

upon Ireland's Parliament, it offered them little real responsibility or
change in their "dominion" status.
In theory, the Irish Parliament of the 1790s had the power to
regulate its own internal affairs, conduct its own foreign policy, and
impose its own custom tariffs— in practice, such power was negligible at
best.

Although the British Parliament could no longer legislate for

Ireland, the royal veto and a very powerful influence over Ireland
remained.

Without an Irish ministry or executive body that was directly

responsible to the Irish Parliament, more often than not, the combined
strength of the British Parliament and the King's Privy Council managed
to guide, if not control most actions and ideological stands taken by the
Irish government.

While the Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary were the
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Irish equivalents of the British Prime Minister, they were Englishmen
appointed and instructed by British government.

Unattached to the Irish

Parliament, these men could be easily and quickly dismissed by the
British government if they granted too many concessions or were too
sympathetic to pleas of the Irish colonials.20
By the end of the century, the religious, economic, and social
barriers that separated Irish Presbyterians from Catholics were weakened
greatly.

The combination of higher duties on consumer goods, the almost

universal opposition to the tithe, and the increased revenues needed by
the British government to finance the war with France produced a clear
set of grievances that were shared by Catholic and Presbyterian alike.
The tithe in particular, was a constant source of agitation.

As the

theoretical right of the Church of England to one-tenth of the fruits of
the earth, in practice the tithe was not only a burdensome tax, but was
also an important factor considered when land was bought or sold, or when
rents were fixed.

Naturally, Catholics and Presbyterians resented paying

for a church to which they did not belong and were aggravated at the
random manner in which tithes were set and collected.21
While the tithe was and had been a matter of considerable anger and
controversy, it was the French Revolution that finally fused Ireland's
two diverse religious groups into a single, anti-British coalition.

Like

the many other "oppressed" masses of Europe, it was the triumph of the
French bourgeoisie that "inspired the advocates of change in all parts of
the British Isles with verve," and gave them "a sense of being
participants in a great European drive against tyranny and anachronistic
privilege."

But most importantly, it assured the Irish "that their cause
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would soon triumph."22
Ireland may have lagged behind her fellow European nations in
social, economic, and political development, but a very active oral
culture brought the events and the ideological principles of the American
and the French Revolutions directly to the minds and hearts of the Irish
masses.

Aside from middle-class literary and political societies

designed to popularize and promote the "republican way," Ireland had a
very active and politically diverse press.

This meant that revolutionary

political ideas were widely disseminated among the broad range of the
Irish citizenry.

Daily reports of the struggles and triumphs of the

revolutionaries bound the middle-class merchants of Ireland to their
bourgeois counterparts in America and France.23
With over sixty-five Irish newspapers in print in the early 1790s,
the press played a central role in the dissemination of information to
the people.

In the Irish crusade for reform and later revolt, the

distribution of printed pamphlets and newspapers helped to mobilize the
people.

After all, it was in the daily press releases that "the French

revolution" like the earlier American Revolution, "burst upon the
world. . .presenting images of blood and disorder, but coming as the
messenger of harmony and freedom to the afflicted nations."24

The

ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity spread quickly among the
general population.

Particularly as the French Revolution progressed and

the people rejected both king and the Constitution of 1791, it became
clear to enthusiastic observers in Ireland that "all ranks and degrees,
all classes and descriptions of persons, the high and the low, the rich
and the poor, the learned and the ignorant, the old, the young, and the

11

middle-aged, all rejoiced and were exceedingly glad."25
While, in Ireland "the people and the press emulated each other in
their congratulations, and in their praises and glorifications of France,
and of the French people," they also recognized that this momentous
overthrow of established authority had broad historical significance.26
Most importantly, the model of the successful revolt in Catholic France
convinced many Irish Protestants that their fellow Roman Catholic
countrymen were not as "unfit for liberty" as they had assumed
previously.

The shared economic and political grievances of the "Irish

people" and the need for mass support eased many Protestant reformers
into "what previously would have been considered an unnatural alliance
with the Catholics."27

Even the bloodletting of the Reign of Terror and

the anti-British sentiment that characterized France during the war
years, could not discourage the Irish in their unwavering and idealized
faith in the Revolution.

Throughout the 1790s, their actions and beliefs

were guided by an "excessive sense of optimism in French goodwill."28
While the Irish had battled against the political, economic, and
social repression of the Anglican aristocracy for decades, it was the
tales of the American and French Revolutions that illuminated their long
list of grievances and pushed them to action.

Like the many other

nations of Europe that witnessed these important historical events,
Ireland "became animated by a new-born vigour. . .and, as if awaking from
a long slumber, imagined that they had discovered in the old social bonds
the shackles that enslaved them."29

Such models of successful

revolution, inspired the Irish to organize themselves around a solid
program of reform and revolution.

While the American Revolution
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encouraged reform, it was the French Revolution that "changed in an
instant the politics of Ireland."30

While only a few years previously

Ireland had been politically lethargic and socially disorganized, by 1790
the Irish were infused with a renewed sense of public spirit.
urgency accompanied the daily news from France.

A frenzied

Theobald Wolfe Tone, a

founder of the United Irishmen and later their ambassador to France, was
one of the most interested and excited observers of the time.

He

summarized the sentiments of many of his fellow countrymen when he
remarked that since "we well knew, experimentally, what it was to be
enslaved, we sympathised most sincerely with the French people, and
watched their progress to freedom with the utmost anxiety."31
From the beginning of the revolt in America in 1776 and in France in
1789, the Irish were ideologically and emotionally tied to their
revolutionary "compatriots" and suffered both their setbacks and
triumphs.

To the Irish, these revolutions created a spell that "rendered

them more and more impatient of their grievances, and prompted them to
more energetic exertion, to break asunder every link of the chains by
which they felt themselves galled."32

A bond of understanding,

compassion, and many shared social circumstances united the Irish
middle-classes to their bourgeois "brothers" of America and France.

As

an example of such sentiments, Bastile Day was celebrated in Belfast on
July 14 of 1790 and 1791, "with an indescribable enthusiasm, never
witnessed there on any occasion before nor since."33

Participants

carried banners that bore the likenesses of Franklin and Mirabeau.

One

person even held an illuminated globe "on which the New World, America,
was represented as shedding a blaze of light on the Old World,
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Europe.”34

While this commemoration of American and French achievements

symbolized Ireland's sympathy for her fellow men, more importantly, July,
1790 marked "the first open demonstration of the political sentiments of
the leading spirits of republicanism" that played a crucial role in Irish
politics throughout the 1790s.35
To a nation whose masses were held in check by class distinctions
and economic restrictions, the American and French Revolutions were
idealized symbols of national achievement.

They offered Irishmen the

hope that tyranny, despotism, and corruption could be swept away and
representative government and financial opportunity instituted in their
place.

The Irish observed first-hand how the initiation of increased

social and political rights was translated into a new sense of national
unity in America and France.

As social divisions worsened and taxes and

tithes continued to rise, increasing numbers of Irishmen were convinced
that they, like their fellow revolutionaries, could shape the destiny of
their nation.36
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CHAPTER II
We Will Not Buy Nor Borrow Our Liberty

For a nation such as Ireland, where political participation and
economic opportunity were reserved for the privileged few, the American
and French Revolutions were far more than isolated events of the North
American or European continents.

Rather, such momentous defeats of

monarchical authority marked turning points in the histories of England,
France, and all the nations of Europe.

The revolutionary notion that

"the people" could triumph over the social oppression and political
corruption of an aristocratic elite inspired dehate, reform, and finally,
open rebellion in Ireland.

With the American Revolution as their

inspiration and the French Revolution as their example, radical members
of Ireland's "middle-class" organized their ranks and mobilized mass
support around the issues of Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation,
and the abolition of tithes, in the hopes that open revolt against
England and Irish independence would be the eventual result.
The French Revolution in particular, had an immediate impact upon
Irish politics.

It was in the early and very critical years of the

Revolution, from 1789 to 1791 that various political radicals and social
reformers merged to form the Society of United Irishmen.

Not

surprisingly, this radical political organization of Protestants and
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Catholics whose ultimate origins lay in the political aftermath of the
American Revolution, borrowed its "character and principles as well as
its actual foundation" directly from "the reformist, universalist and
republican ideals of the French Revolution."1
Founded first in Belfast in 1791 and in Dublin in 1792 (see map 1),
the Society of United Irishmen began as one of many reform associations
that sprang to life in the midst of the public uproar over the American
and French Revolutions.

As one part of a larger network of British

radical organizations centered in London, the Society drew many of its
ideological principles and political methods from its counterparts in
England and Scotland.2

However, The Society of United Irishmen quickly

distinguished itself as the "most radical and most influential of all the
British political clubs generated by the reform euphoria of the 1790s"3
with its calls for an Irish revolution with French assistance.

Unlike

the United Irishmen, the demands of most British radical organizations
were not consciously revolutionary.

Rather, they sought far more

traditional reforms of Britain's long-standing political and social
institutions.4
As the most publicly conspicuous and socially influential political
organization of eighteenth-century Ireland, the United Irishmen had a
self-appointed duty to Ireland that they took very seriously.

As a

result, they attracted "a membership impressive in wealth, intellectual
ability, and social standing."3

The Society drew many of its leaders

from among the most qualified and well-educated men of Ireland's business
and professional classes.

In its first years, the Dublin club claimed

that there were over 360 men "admitted" to their Society.

Of the total
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of 360, there were approximately 200 active members and an average
meeting attendance of 50-90 men.

While some members came from the

professional class of lawyers or barristers, the majority of the Dublin
Society, like the other clubs, consisted of successful tradesmen, cloth
merchants, and textile manufacturers whose businesses suffered from the
economic ill effects of the British mercantilist system.6

Of those 200

active members,

there were 80 reported Protestants and 73 Catholics.

This proportion

is typical of most clubs.

Despite Ireland's

overwhelmingly Catholic population, the bulk of the United Irish
leadership in these early years came almost exclusively from the urban
Protestant classes of Dublin or Belfast.7
While the most urbanized, affluent, and well-educated Protestants
monopolized the

leadership of the United Irishmen, the Society still

enjoyed a substantial popular following among many Protestants and
Catholics of the Irish countryside.

Because clubs existed in Armagh,

Clonmel, Gorey, Limerick, Lisburn, Nenagh, Sixmilewater, Templepatrick,
and Tullamore as well as in Belfast and Dublin, the Society's membership
extended to a broad range of Irish society.8

However, their influence

remained particularly strong in the more prosperous regions of the north,
east, and midlands and in the suburban areas in and around the cities of
Belfast and Dublin.

Membership increased in number and strength in the

more modern, commercialized towns and cities of Ireland, where better
roads and increased commerce meant improved communication networks that
facilitated the dissemination of information about the Society and its
political ideologies.9
From the founding of the first club in 1791, the Society's leaders
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were intent upon the organization of a cohesive public force in an effort
to create “a general union of sentiment among the various classes" of
Ireland "upon whose co-operation they were to depend."10

Their goal was

to bring all Irishmen together, regardless of economic class or religious
persuasion, to form a united front of opposition to British policies and
practices.

To do so, the United Irishmen played upon the strong

anti-British sentiment that already existed among so many of their fellow
citizens.

Always stressing the importance of Irish national pride, the

Society was ultimately successful in its attempts, because it brought
Irishmen together in small, organized groups in which "Protestants and
Catholics— all religious sects, forgot their prejudices and nobly rallied
under one common standard— the standard of the nation."11
As Ireland's primary reformist political organization of the early
1790s, the stated goals of the United Irishmen included fairly moderate
calls for changes in the structure and intent of Irish politics and
society.

In these early years, the Society's leaders publicly labelled

themselves as republicans "in the manner of the classical republicanism
of the English 'country' or 'real Whigs.'"

They "accepted monarchy" in

theory, but "sought to curb the powers of central government, to preserve
fundamental liberties, and to secure religious toleration."12

They felt

a great sense of social responsibility towards Ireland and her people.
The masthead of the Society's newspaper the Northern Star summarized
such feelings when it proclaimed in 1791, "The Public Will our Guide— The
Public Good our End."13
At this time, the social and political objectives of the United
Irishmen were quite simple and very straightforward.

After considerable
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deliberation and debate among Society leaders, the United Irishmen
decided upon a public platform that would attract the greatest number of
Irishmen to their cause.

Their plan included calls for Parliamentary

reform. Catholic emancipation, and the reduction or peaceful elimination
of English influence in the Irish government.14

With nearly three

million Irishmen excluded from active political participation, the United
Irishmen recognized that there was a great reservoir of social power that
lay dormant in Ireland.

The possibility of such a social force at their

disposal only encouraged the United Irishmen.

It meant that the issue of

a property qualification for the franchise was dismissed quickly by the
Society.

Instead, full support was put behind a public platform that

called for universal manhood suffrage and Catholic emancipation in
addition to a reform of Parliament.13

The Dublin club summarized what

they felt were the beliefs of all Irishmen when they stated:
The great object of this Society is a real
representation of the Irish Nation in an Irish
Parliament; and as friends of the whole People, we
support the necessity of Catholic emancipation as a
means of making representation what it ought to be,
Free, Equal, and Entire.16
The creation of an independent Irish republic was not an openly
stated goal in the first years of the Society, despite the convictions of
many United Irish leaders.

After all, such founders as Theobald Wolfe

Tone and James Napper Tandy were ardent and radical republicans.17

Tone

readily admitted that he "was a Democrat from the very commencement" and
characterized his friend Tandy as "a very sincere republican."18

Dr.

William Drennan, one of the founders of the Dublin club, had written as
early as 1791 that the Society would have "the Rights of Hen and the
Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number as its end," but "Real
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independence to Ireland, and Republicanism" would be "its particular
purpose."19

Led by a group of political radicals who felt close

ideological ties to the French and American revolutionaries, the
Society's shift to more overtly radical republican policies was virtually
inevitable.

Many members of the United Irishmen recognized early on,

that Parliamentary reform and Catholic emanicipation were touted as the
objects of their organization only to gain mass backing and to pacify
their more moderate supporters.

In reality, the "real Purposes" of the

United Irishmen "were to separate Great Britain from Ireland, and to
subvert the present Constitution."20
As the French Revolution progressed, the news of its events formed
an increasingly large and important part of the daily lives of Irishmen.
Greater numbers of Irishmen imitated the French style of manners and
dress and a National Guard was formed in Dublin.21

In light of the

French accomplishments, English power appeared far less formidable than
ever before.

While it was not spoken of openly, the possibility of a

successful Irish revolt loomed in the future.

To many United Irishmen,

it was clear that the time was ripe for a substantial change in the
Society’s public platform, for "political questions, both foreign and
domestic, and the enacting of several unpopular laws, had advanced the
minds of many people, even before they were aware of it, towards
Republicanism and Revolution."22
The Society's relatively moderate calls for reform no longer suited
the restless mood of Ireland.

Archibald Hamilton Rowan, secretary of the

Dublin club, reported that as the United Irish movement spread among the
general public, policies took on a life of their own.

While calls for
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Parliamentary reform and Catholic emancipation had initially answered the
demands of most United Irishmen, soon "nothing less than separation from
England would satisfy some of the leaders (and the followers), who
thought this might be accomplished by the assistance of France."23
Plans for an independent Parliament with legislative membership open to
Irishmen of all religious persuasions was no longer enough to satisfy
many.

Instead, as the sense of national pride and purpose expanded, the

notion of an independent Ireland became increasingly important to Society
members.

As the self-appointed representatives of Ireland, the United

Irishmen responded with a vow that: "We will not buy or borrow liberty
from America or from France, but manufacture it ourselves, and work it up
with those materials which the hearts of Irishmen furnish them with at
home."24
It was upon the outbreak of war between France and England in
February 1793 that the public character of the United Irishmen underwent
a gradual but significant transformation from a club of urban social
reformers into a "militantly anti-English, anti-monarchical republican
movement" that was the direct result of "the reaction of a general
European crisis upon the peculiar historical situation in Ireland."25
Compounded by the already unsettling events of the Revolution, the
political and social disruptions of war were enough to finally change the
United Irishmen "from a small and ineffectual group of radical reformers
. . .into a secret, oath-bound and hierarchical organization led by
ardent republicans" and finally "into an armed and mass insurrectionary
levy, prepared to act in an auxiliary role to French invasion forces."26
In the eyes of most Irishmen, the war of the First Coalition drew
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clear battle lines between the despotic monarchies of Europe and the
noble republic of France.

Never before had the United Irishmen's call of

"Citizen Soldiers, to arms!" elicited such an emotional response from
their fellow countrymen.27

Within the Society it was a commonly held

belief that "every man should become a Soldier in the defence of his
rights."28

To those United Irishmen who were already committed to the

ideals of republicanism, if not the notion of full Irish independence,
the grand nation of France was undoubtedly innocent of all possible
wrongdoings.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities in 1793, the Dublin

Society publicly decreed that:

"This Society is convinced that this war

would never be carried on, if it did not tend to effectuate a treaty, or
rather a conspiracy, entered into by tyrants and abettors of tyranny."
To the members of a nation battling against British colonial authority
and political oppression, it appeared that, "France had committed no
crime, unless the emancipation of 24 millions of men be one."2®
In the wake of this great European crisis, nothing appeared "more
natural" and "more seasonable” to the United Irishmen than that "those
(Irishmen) who had common interests, and common enemies, who suffered
common wrongs, and lay claim to common rights, should know each other,
and should act together."30

Yet, the Society still faced the dilemma of

how to translate their specific political goals and ideologies into a
more general formula that was attractive to the mass of Ireland's poor
and uneducated peasants.

While they had the active support of Ireland's

middle-classes, many United Irishmen wisely recognized that "there was a
fund of strength and indignation in the Irish people," (particularly
among the lower classes of Roman Catholics), "which, if skillfully
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directed, would vanquish every obstacle."31

In order to achieve the

mass mobilization necessary to create a revolution. Society leaders
needed to channel the long-held anger and resentment of the nationfs
Roman Catholics into the energy of their organization.32
In an effort to create a substantial national following, the Society
of United Irishmen reorganized and redefined the structure and intent of
their organization.

Between 1794-1796, the Society took its efforts to

become a more radical political-military organization underground.

To

hide their efforts from the increasingly attentive Anglo-Irish
authorities, the existing clubs were subdivided into smaller and more
flexible units that each elected a secretary and a treasurer.

To achieve

a more efficient military structure, a hierarchical system of committees
was established on the local, regional, and national levels.

In

imitation of the new French system, the committees were governed by a
General Executive Directory of five elected officials.33
While from behind the scenes, the Society was restructured to
prepare for increased civil and military activity,

from the public

perspective, the character of the United Irishmen also changed.

In an

effort to attract greater numbers of the peasantry to their cause, public
policies were modified.

To their platform of issues, the Society added a

campaign to abolish tithes and a general vow to improve the economic
conditions of Ireland’s laboring man.34

Furthermore, political

concessions made to the Catholic majority by an increasingly nervous
Anglo-Irish government assisted in the radicalization of the
organization.

In particular, the Catholic Relief Bill of April 1793 that

gave Ireland's Roman Catholics the right to bear arms, greatly helped the
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United Irishmen mobilize and militarize their ranks of Catholic
supporters.33

By 1796, the United Irishmen had successfully convinced

large segments of the Irish population that they were the sole protectors
and defenders of their liberty.

To a young man of Ulster, during this

time it appeared that:
In every part of the kingdom, societies of United
Irishmen were organized; and all my brothers. . .as
well as myself
were enrolled as members; whilst
arms, including pikes, were collected and
manufactured, and carefully concealed.36
Meanwhile in France, the years between the outbreak of war with
England in 1793 and the year 1796 were marked by an increasingly
aggressive foreign policy.

To the United Irishmen and the many other

radical organizations in existence across the European continent, the
most important manifestation of this policy was the November 1792 decree
in which France offered "fraternity and assistance to all people wishing
to recover their liberty."37

Although this policy of active

intervention was later modified by the French government upon the advice
of Georges Jacques Danton, it nonetheless dictated the tone and intent of
Franco-United Irish relations until 1798.
The United Irishmen interpreted this decree as the equivalent of a
direct offer of financial and military assistance from the French.

In an

organization that already supported the ideology of the Revolution, this
French promise only reconfirmed the underlying republican tendencies of
the Society's leaders.

Motivated by such general assurances from the

French, the United Irishmen launched on a determined quest for an
independent Irish state even when "interference in neutral countries was
entirely ruled out by the French (leaders).

If the subjects of an enemy
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rebelled, France would support them: but she could not be expected to
foot the bill for the preliminary revolutionization."38

This made

little difference to the United Irishmen, who flocked to Paris in these
early years to promote and even plead their cause to the French.38
1792 marked the opening phase of Franco-United Irish relations.
Encouraged by the anti-British war propaganda running rampant in Ireland
and by the pro-revolutionary policies of France, the United Irishmen
looked increasingly to France as a potential source of financial and
military aid.

Ideological guidance was no longer sufficient to sustain a

nation mobilized for insurrection.

Instead, the Irish radicals needed

tangible support from the French to carry out a successful revolt against
England.

At the same time in France, the political leaders first began

to view the United Irishmen as a potentially powerful and highly
lucrative political force that could be employed as an effective

weapon

against their English enemies.
In the Paris of the early 1790s, many Irish radicals-in-exile
pressured the French government to consider the desperate situation of
Ireland and the possibility of direct intervention.

The French leaders

finally conceded to Irish wishes and sent an American, Lieutenant Colonel
Eleazer Oswald to survey the situation in May 1793.40

After a tour of

the nation and meetings with various officials including Lord Edward
Fitzgerald,41 Oswald concluded that "though there was plenty of
discontent in Ireland there was little likelihood of a popular rising in
the immediate future."42

While his pronouncement was a great

disappointment to the United Irishmen, it was not his statement,but the
internal French political crisis of the Reign of Terror that temporarily
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terminated the first diplomatic exchanges between France and the United
Irishmen.
As their organization grew larger and more radical, the United
Irishmen were increasingly determined in their pursuit of French approval
and support.

In Paris, the workings of long-time Irish exile Nicholas

Nadgett, an intelligence officer in the French admiralty, convinced the
French leaders to restore their dialogue with the United Irishmen.

In

January 1794, upon the urgings of Madgett, the Committee of Public Safety
sent William Jackson as their agent to Ireland.43

While there, he was

to gauge the English response to a French invasion of Ireland and to
"ascertain the state of public opinion in Ireland, in order to determine
whether it would be desirable to invade that country."44
Jackson was a typical example of the many Irish exiles in residence
in France.

He was of Irish descent, but had begun his career as a tutor

in London.

Later, he became an Anglican clergyman and acted as the

personal companion and chaplain to the Duchess of Kingston.

In 1790,

swept up by the fervor of the French Revolution, Jackson emigrated to
France where he played an active role in their new government.

Upon his

arrival in England in 1794 as emissary to Ireland for the French
government, Jackson renewed an old friendship with a London attorney
named John Cockayne.

He hired Cockayne as a travelling companion and

guide, unaware that his friend was a loyal Englishman prepared to act as
a spy for Pitt and the British government.45
Jackson was not greeted warmly upon his arrival in Dublin in April
1794.

With the British government becoming increasingly aggressive in

its pursuit of United Irishmen, many United Irishmen suspected that
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Jackson was a British spy and refused to meet with him.

Others, such as

Lord Edward Fitzgerald, had doubts about French intentions and insisted
that the Irish should make the first effort at revolt, utilizing the
French only as allies and not liberators.46

Only Hamilton Rowan,

secretary of the Dublin Society, was confident of Jackson and his
mission.

Rowan agreed to meet with him from his cell in Newgate, where

he was imprisoned on sedition charges.

In their discussions, Jackson

assured Rowan that "if the people of Ireland were inclined to reform the
abuses of their government by a declaration of independence, that the
French government would assist them in any way they might prefer," and
most important to the Irish, "would desire no further interference."47
Encouraged by the meeting. Rowan convinced his friend and fellow
United Irish leader, Theobald Wolfe Tone to compose an official statement
on the current state of Ireland for the Committee of Public Safety.
Tone's essay presented a general survey of the contemporary social and
political conditions in Ireland.

While he confirmed that a French

invasion "of sufficient force" would be supported by a majority of the
Irish people, he also spoke of the need to send an "official" United
Irish representative to Paris.48
composed this fateful letter.

Tone later recounted the night that he

He had gone home that evening and "made a

sketch of the state of Ireland. . .and the inference" of his paper "was,
that circumstances in Ireland were favorable to a French invasion."49
After transcription by Rowan, the letter was delivered to Jackson.
Forewarned of the dangers of the royal mail, Jackson was foolish and
mailed the letter anyway.

Thanks to the work of Cockayne, the letter was

intercepted by the British government and Jackson was arrested in April
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1794.

At his trial in 1795 he was convicted of treason by an Anglo-Irish

court.

However, he died from a suicidal dose of arsenic while he stood

in the dock and awaited the sentence of the death penalty.30
Naturally, the disappointing end to the Jackson mission was a great
blow to the hopes of the United Irishmen.

While it caused the active

suppression of the organization by the British government, the Jackson
letter also implicated Rowan on charges of treason

and encouraged him to

devise his escape from prison and subsequent flight to
States.51

the United

More importantly, the Jackson affair temporarily sabotaged

the newly-established relations between the French

and the United Irish.

Although it was clear to most United Irishmen that

the French leaders

would respond favorably to Irish pleas for military and financial
assistance in the future— how far in the future remained an unanswered
question.32
While the cessation of diplomatic relations with the French upset
many United Irishmen, the Jackson affair coincided with, and even
accelerated the consolidation and further radicalization of the Society.
Many of the more conservative members were scared away by the British
threats that accompanied the arrest and trial of Jackson.

Those members

who remained were a small, but highly dedicated group of republican
radicals.

These men "were totally committed to the policy of soliciting

a French invasion of Ireland" in the hopes of creating an independent
Irish state.53

Driven underground by the active pursuit of the British

government, the Society publicly adopted the more radical and
revolutionary ideologies of its leaders as its official political
policies.
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By 1796, the transformation and militarization of the Society was
nearly complete.

The United Irishmen were more prepared than ever before

to support a French invasion of Ireland.
into a tight hierarchical structure.

Their leadership was organized

They had gained the support of

large numbers of Ireland's peasants with their calls for Catholic
emancipation, universal suffrage, and the abolition of tithes.
Furthermore, in 1796 the United Irish absorbed the Catholic agrarian
organization, the "Defenders" into their ranks.

This move not only

enlarged membership, it also furthered the cause of religious unity and
"brought to the society a deeply rooted tradition of agrarian violence,
and an intense hatred of the established government" at Dublin Castle.54
Diplomatically, the events of the previous three years, including the
many discussions with the French government and the missions of Oswald
and Jackson, convinced the United Irishmen that France was fully
committed to assisting in their future rebellion against England.

"Given

every reason to think that France was eager to supply military
assistance," the United Irishmen mobilized their ranks, gathered weapons,
and plotted possible courses of action.55
The reorganization and enlargement of the United Irishmen occurred
in spite of Anglo-Irish efforts to eliminate what they considered to be a
growing amount of "politically submissive" behavior throughout the
British Isles.

Particularly in Ireland, the Jackson affair and the

accompanying rumors of a French invasion, scared many officials Dublin
Castle.

It appeared that quick action was necessary to counteract the

efforts of such groups as the United Irishmen.

Consequently, two bills

were passed that regulated behavior at public political protests.

The
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Treasonable Practices Bill of 1795 modified the existing treason law to
include anyone who intended harm to the King, plotted to assist foreign
invaders, or sought to intimidate the Houses of Parliament in speech or
writing.

In the same year, the Seditious Meetings Bill was also passed.

This law gave local magistrates discretionary control over any public
meeting of fifty or more people and required prior notice to be given
before any such meeting occurred.56
While these laws were aimed at combatting the fervor of reformist
political activity across the British Isles, other acts passed by the
Irish Parliament were directed specifically at the activities and
practices of the United Irishmen.

The Insurrection Act of 1796 made it a

capital offense to administer an illegal oath or an oath that bound a
person to a seditious society.
partially suspended.

Also in 1796, the Habeas Corpus Act was

This move allowed the government to detain those

persons suspected of treasonable activities with a warrant authorized by
the Lord Lieutantent or Chief Secretary.
was organized.

Also at this time, the yeomanry

They would assist the army in the event of an invasion

and act in the capacities of a police force.

The Irish Parliament was

becoming increasingly reactionary and repressive in response to pressure
from the British government.
to be stopped.

The activities of the United Irishmen had

Yet, these laws had just the opposite effect.

Although

many Irishmen were arrested and prosecuted for their treasonable
behaviors, these laws only made the United Irishmen more determined to
further their cause and more selective of how, when, and where they would
move next.57
At the same time, France's governing body was also restructured.

In
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1795, a five-man Directory was established as France's principal
governing body.

Under the Directory, French foreign policy was guided by

the personal motives and goils of the individual Directors.
policy often lacked cohesion and consistency.

As a result,

Only a chronic shortage of

funds, an increasing concern for military strategy and power politics,
and a general belief that Europe might be republicanized, provided a
certain amount of uniformity.58

The liberation of Ireland was a small

and insignificant matter to the French Directors.

Before 1796,French

leaders were curious about the Irish situation, but remained firm in
their conviction to avoid any direct support for the early stages of
foreign revolution.

The French temporarily quelled theever-insistent

pleadings of the Irish exiles in Paris by sending first Oswald, then
Jackson to Ireland to assess the political climate.

However, the French

refused any real commitment of their troops or money to Ireland.
Changes in the European political situation in 1796 focused the
attention of the French Directors upon Ireland.

Angered by the

underhanded English support of the civil war in the Vendee, the
possibility of an Irish invasion appeared to be the best way for France
to strike a decisive blow against England.

It was then, for the first

time, that "Ireland assumed an important place in French strategy."39
With revenge against England as the object of their mission, the French
planned an invasion of Ireland co-ordinated with a raid into Wales as the
best way to accomplish their goal.

It was the "desire for revenge" among

many Frenchmen that made Ireland "a special case, and the logistical
difficulties of supplying and maintaining military support at a distance"
that made "a swift victory more necessary and a full-scale invasion more
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likely in Ireland than in any other country with a strong internal
revolutionary movement."6 0
1796 was the first year of the three-year Franco-United Irish
partnership.

At this time, France agreed to begin official discussions

with the United Irishnen about the details of a French invasion.

Upon

the opening of quasi-official diplomatic relations between the two
groups, the United Irishmen had to try to convince the French of exactly
how, when, and on what terms this revolution should take place.

The

United Irishmen were particularly concerned that France would not only
agree to sponsor their rebellion, but would also pledge to honor
Ireland's independent status after it was accomplished.

In spite of

their seemingly good intentions, most French leaders held little regard
for the political and social ramifications of an Irish revolution.

In

reality, they sought the most attractive and least expensive way to
destroy the British.

They were willing to sponsor a rebellion in Ireland

only for their own benefit and any such war would be executed on French
terms and under French command.

France's ultimate goal was "to deal a

mortal blow to England's war plans with the minimum of effort on her own
part."61
To mark the start of their revolutionary partnership, Theobald Wolfe
Tone travelled to Paris as the official United Irish representative to
France.

While there, he met with the Director Lazare Carnot, Charles

Delacroix, the French Foreign Minister, and General Henri Jacques
Guillaume Clarke.62

Carnot was the most adamantly anti-English of the

French Directors and welcomed the plans for an Irish revolution in the
hopes that it would be England's "Vendee."63

Clarke and Delacroix were
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more moderate in their intentions.

They believed that French assistance

should be on a smaller scale and agreed to supply the Irish rebels with
arms, ammunition, and money, but no invasion forces.

With a successful

revolt dependent upon a full-scale French expeditionary force, this offer
was totally unacceptable to the United Irishmen.64
Tone faced a tough diplomatic battle in Paris.

While the Directors

agreed "to take up the business of Ireland in the strongest possible
manner that circumstances would possibly admit," their offer of some
thirty pieces of cannon, 20,000 stand of arms, and some money was still
not sufficient.65

To convince Clarke and Delacroix of their critical

need of French assistance, Tone initially based his argument upon
ideological assurances.

He promised the French that he "had no doubt

whatever that, if we succeeded, we would establish a Republic," and
expounded upon the Society's long-term commitment to revolution.66
More than the purity of Irish intent. Tone had to convince the
French that a full-scale invasion and accompanying revolution in Ireland
would bring them considerable material rewards.
argument was solid and convincing.

In this respect, his

He asserted boldly that the United

Irishmen were so widely supported that the Irish masses would flock to
assist French invasion forces intent upon the establishment of a
republic.

Tone added that the formation of an independent Irish republic

would deprive England of vital resources and manpower, while the French
would gain a loyal ally, a trading partner, and a strategic-military
advantage over her rival Britain.67
Thanks to Carnot's intense hatred of England and a lingering spirit
of "republican internationalism" among the French Directors, Tone's
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exercise in secret diplomacy was a success.68

The Directory agreed to

"send an expeditionary force to Ireland with the aim of liberating that
country and reducing England to the rank of a second-class power."69
Two detachments of troops would sail from Brest to Galway with
approximately 11,000 men.

At the same time, three detachments of

European recruits would sail from Holland to join the expedition.

The

United Irishmen gladly accepted this proposal only after it was clearly
understood that the French "should come as Allies, to act under the
Directions of the projected Revolutionary Government."

Fearful of future

debts, they also insisted that the French were to "be paid the Expenses
of the Expedition, and their Troops receive Irish Pay whilst they acted
here."70

With apparent confirmations by the French, the mission was

underway.
High hopes for the future revolt accompanied the French invasion
forces that sailed from Brest in December 1796.

The mission was under

the command of Lazare Hoche, one of France's most distinguished generals.
He was accompanied by an excited Theobald Wolfe Tone, dressed in full
French military uniform.71

Their force of 45 ships was "well provided"

with weapons, according to Tone.

Upon departure, they carried

approximately 41,160 stands of arms, 20 pieces of field artillery and 9
of seige, 61,200 barrels of gun powder, 7,000,000 musket cartridges, and
700,000 flints.72
departure.

However, there were reasons for caution upon

Tone knew that the French Navy had been badly hit by the

purges of the Revolution.

It suffered from the losses of many of its

best trained aristocratic officers, its ships had undergone long periods
of neglect and disuse, and morale was low following a number of defeats

39

at the hands of the British.73
Although the expedition sailed from France to Ireland without
British interception, bad weather drove them off their intended course
✓
and separated General Hoche on the frigate Fraternite from the main
body of ships (see map 2).

One group of ships finally made its way into

Bantry Bay, a small inlet on the south-west coast of Ireland that was far
south of the intended destination of Galway (see maps 2 & 3).

Despite

such difficulties, the commanders decided to land and lay seige to the
south-west city of Cork with the 6,500 available troops (see map 2).
This plan of action was doomed from its inception, for severe winter
storms prevented them from landing.74

A British naval officer observed

that conditions were "so extremely bad, thick, rainy, and blowing hard,"
that it was "impossible for them to attempt landing troops or indeed
doing any Thing."75

Tone sadly recognized the desperate state of their

mission and exclaimed:

"I see nothing before me, unless a miracle be

wrought in our favour, but the ruin of the expedition, the slavery of my
country and my own destruction."76

After sixteen days of bad weather,

the fleet withdrew and sailed again for France— their mission of
revolution an utter failure.77
The fiasco of Bantry Bay was the first of several failed French
missions that sailed before 1799 in the hope of "liberating Ireland" from
the British.78

In France and Ireland, the men involved reacted to the

news of the disasterous expedition with a mixture of disappointment and
frustration.

The French considered the Bantry Bay excursion as an

embarrassing failure and a waste of men, munitions, and money.

Napoleon

Bonaparte, in command of the army of Italy, believed that those troops
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should have been sent to him.

It was clear to most Frenchmen that "Hoche

had gained nothing from this gamble."79

Pressured by public outrage and

disappointment, the Directory "re-imposed its standing policy on
intervention abroad."80
Although the failure of the Bantry Bay expedition was a great
disappointment to the United Irishmen, most members refused to accept
that an successful rebellion against England did not form a large and
signficant space in Ireland's future.

After all, by 1796, the hope for

an independent Ireland was no longer the secret plan of several United
Irish leaders.

In the five years since its inception, the Society of

United Irishmen had not only grown in numbers and in strength, it had
also restructured itself on a close-knit hierarchical basis, and had
become openly radical and revolutionary.

Supported by a fairly

significant segment of the Irish peasantry and hopeful of continued
assistance from France, the United Irishmen continued their calls for
revolution.
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MAP 2
BANTRY BAY EXPEDITION - 1798
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CHAPTER III
Citizen Soldiers, To Arms!

As the year 1798 unfolded and disastrous events of Bantry Bay in
1796 faded to little more than a bad memory in the minds of most men, the
Society of United Irishmen and their growing number of followers
reorganized their ranks and faced the future with a renewed sense of hope
and optimism for the cause of a wholly independent Ireland.

Their

anticipation was not without warrant, for before them loomed both the
beginning and the end of their long awaited struggle for Irish liberty.
This was to be an eventful year.
that

For years afterward, it was remarked

"Never was there an era in the history of any country which, in so

short a space of time, gave birth to such numerous and varied
circumstances as did the memorable year 1798 in Ireland."1
While Bantry Bay represented a dismal failure of the past relations
between the United Irishmen and France, many men remained firmly
committed to the idea of an Irish revolution supported with and supplied
by French military and financial assistance.

Even those few United

Irishmen who "wished to accomplish a Revolution in this country (Ireland)
without the intervention of the French,"

agreed that "they would join

the French" because they knew their goal could not be achieved without
outside help.2

It was a widely held belief among most United Irishmen
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that French intervention was imperative if full independence from England
was to be actually achieved.
Bantry Bay had provided several valuable lessons.

By 1798, the

United Irishmen knew that they were dependent upon an "Irish populace"
that was nothing more than "an agricultural population, full of vigor,
burning for the conflict, and long inured to the habits of
insurrection."3

Although the intentions of the general population were

noble; as the men who would form the mass of the rebel infantry, they
lacked professional weapons, military discipline, and battlefield skill.
The United Irishmen presumed that the presence of the French on Irish
soil, would not only supply the necessary military leadership and weapons
to fuel a rebellion, but would also lend ideological cohesion and a
strong sense of purpose to the fight.

As a result of many internal calls

for renewed action towards revolution, the Directory of the United
Irishmen decided to restore its diplomatic relations with the French.
As part of the United Irishmen's most determined effort to solicit
money, arms, and military leadership from the French, they resolved to
establish an even more structured line of communication and
correspondence between themselves and the French Directory.
resident United Irish Minister to Paris was appointed.

To do so, a

Edward John

Lewins, a Dublin attorney and prominent Catholic member of the United
Irishmen was selected to be the first such representative.

He was sent

to Paris in April 1797 under the assumed name of Thompson, "to act as the
Minister of the Irish Republican Directory at Paris."4

In June of the

same year, he was joined by a second United Irish "messenger," Dr.
William James McNevin.

Together, they were to plead the cause of liberty
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in Ireland in the hope that once again the French would offer their
assistance.
While Lewins and McHevin worked in Paris, preparations for the revolt
were underway in Ireland.

By early 1798, the United Irishmen and their

many followers considered themselves to be fairly well prepared for a
revolt of substantial magnitude.

While they still lacked the essential

military leadership, weapons, and considerable financial support needed
to wage a successful revolt, they had high hopes that their French
"compatriots'* would come to their rescue in the end.
they had inspiration.

Most importantly,

The United Irishmen were particularly successful

in cultivating a belief among their fellow countrymen that

"the people

alone are the fountain of all just power, and that to their freely chosen
delegates belongs the right of exercising authority over the nation."3
The organization had done a first-rate job of infusing the Irish masses
with a strong sense of anger at their present conditions, while at the
same time it instilled them with the hope of a bright future under United
Irish leadership.

To the United Irishmen, it seemed that few of their

fellow men could resist their optimistic predictions for a new Ireland.
They felt that they offered something for everyone.

While "they (the

United Irishmen) promised to the Presbyterians an irrestible lure, that
of over-turning the Constitution, and of raising a Republic on its
ruins,"

to the Catholics they hinted at "a rich and splendid

establishment of a Popish Hierarchy under the protection of the French,
provided they joined them in establishing a Republican form of
Government."6
The rebellion was scheduled to begin on May 23, 1798.

By April, the
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United Irishmen felt that all of Ireland was ready to wage a substantial
fight against the British.

In reality, only isolated regions were

prepared for such a revolution.
region (see map 1).

The province of Ulster was one such

As the stronghold of the organization, there were

reported to be upwards of 100,000 men ready to take the field in Ulster
in defense of their national liberty.

Hore importantly, these men were

sufficiently equipped and fairly well trained.

This was perhaps the only

area where the men were actually supplied with pikes, muskets, other
firearms, and even had some cannons and ammunition.

Despite Ulster's

readiness, most rebels across Ireland remained unprepared and
ill-equipped to wage a battle of any significant proportions.7
Unfortunately, the rebellion that was launched on May 23, 1798 was
not the "great revolutionary upheaval" that was originally planned.

It

began as scheduled in Dublin and the nearby counties of Wexford and
Wicklow and quickly spread eastward into Leinster and north to Ulster
(see map 1).

However, this was by no means the "national rising" that

the United Irish leaders intended, "in which the popular
forces,. . .joined by many Irish soldiers in the government ranks and
supported by France, would overwhelm the demoralized adherents of a
discredited regime."8

Instead, information leaked to the Anglo-Irish

government about the planned insurrection resulted in the arrests of 13
members of the Leinster Directory and 3 national Directors of the United
Irishmen in March 1798.

This action deprived the United Irishmen of

their primary structure of leadership in the two crucial months before
the rebellion and only aggravated the unpreparedness of the rebel ranks.
Those United Irishmen next in line had to scramble to take control
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quickly, even though they were unprepared for the duty.

As a result,

operations were poorly coordinated and somewhat disorganized.

Most

importantly,

fighting was confined to those wealthier counties

of the

north, east,

and south, where support for and participation in

the United

Irishmen had

always been the strongest.9

Despite

many events that did not go according to plan, the rebellion

of 1798 was a revolt of significant proportions.

By its conclusion

several months later, it was estimated that approximately eighty thousand
of those involved were killed— fifty thousand rebels and thirty thousand
on the side of England.10

Fighting was reported to be fierce.

The

rebellion was the ideal opportunity for Irishmen to vent their long-held
anger upon their English oppressors.

It was the rebels who were most

often blamed for every destruction of property, pillaging of land, or
death of an innocent person that occurred.

By the summer and fall of

1798, it was said that "the midland and southern counties" were
"distinguished in barbarity, resorting, in addition to murder and
robbery, to the ancient practices of burning the corn and houghing the
cattle of those against whom their rage was directed."11

It seemed that

all over Ireland, "massacres in cold blood— house burnings— military
executions— whole districts depopulated— tortures— flagellations,
submersions, and imprisonments, appeared on every side."12
By all accounts, large areas of Ireland were in a state of chaotic
upheaval.

Anglo-Irish newspapers and periodicals of the time were filled

with tales of death and destruction from both sides.

The British were

particularly interested in the accounts of what they considered to be the
"evil" deeds of the Irish rebels.

While many of these stories were based

53

upon truths, they were often exaggerated to fuel anti-Irish sentiment
among loyalists.

There were tales of conspiracies between blacksmiths

and carpenters who had been supplied with iron and wood to make pikes for
the rebels.

In Ireland, a common fear circulated among many wealthy

landowners that servants had been contracted by the rebels to kill their
masters in exchange for the permanent possession of their estates once a
republic was established.13

The involvement of women was regarded with

particular distaste by the loyalists.

One English newspaper noted that

"the fanaticism which unhappily pervades the greater part of Ireland,
appears to have reached even the female sex.

A lady,. . .actually put on

the green, or rebel uniform, marched in the ranks of the insurgents, and
shot several men with her own hand."14

While the rebels "proceeded in

no gentle way in many neighbourhoods" took "money, arms, and property"
and stained "their progress. . .with the blood of many innocent people,"
they were by no means solely responsible for the many atrocities
committed against their fellow countrymen.15

A gentleman recalled that

"the intruments employed of death and torture, though dissimilar, were
alike destructive:

the bullet, sabre, bayonet, lash, and halter" were

"met by the pike, the scythe, the blunderbuss, the hatchet, and the
firebrand."16
With the rebellion underway, it appeared to outside observers that
the United Irishmen had "fully organized its form and political
existence" to form a substantial force to be reckoned with by the
British.17

The reality of the rebel situation was quite different.

There was only a small contingent of rebel leaders who coordinated some
of the operations.

Much of the actual fighting was carried out
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independently of Society leaders by the peasants of Ireland, who had
strong ties to their land and numerous loyalties to their fellow
countrymen.18

As participants in a rebellion that offered them the hope

of secured lands and full political rights, these men assembled
themselves into poorly armed, and largely unguided mobs that faced their
opponents bravely, motivated only by the most immediate and tangible
objectives.

While they had the might to "sweep forward with the

irresistible and frightening force of a confident, determined crowd,"
they were also easily discouraged by any and all failures, no matter how
small.19
Although it seemed that "the whole Irish nation, with the exception
of persons pre-corrupted by the English Government, was animated by the
same spirit" of revolution,20 support was not really so widespread.

It

was reported that the rebels resorted to recruiting many "volunteers" by
force, because they desperately needed to increase their fighting ranks.
There were stories of how farmers were attacked by United Irishmen in
their homes at night and threatened with death if they did not take the
oath of secrecy and join their fellow countrymen in revolt.21
Nonetheless, the United Irishmen and their fellow rebels did have certain
distinct advantages that they used wisely to achieve several early
victories over their Anglo-Irish opponents.

They knew how to play upon

the pro-rebel sympathies of some of the governmental troops stationed in
Ireland.

They were also accustomed to Ireland's wild and mountainous

terrain and used such knowledge to launch successful surprise attacks on
the British.22
In the long run, the disorganized, poorly equipped, and largely
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untrained rebels were no match for the combined forces of the British and
Irish governments.

From the start of the revolt in May 1798, the Irish

administration responded with several decisive measures designed to quell
the fighting and restore law and order to Ireland as quickly as possible.
On May 24, 1798, martial law was declared.

Issued by the Lord Lieutenant

of Ireland, Lord Camden, this decree threatened "to punish all persons
acting, aiding, or in any manner assisting in the Rebellion which now
exists in this Kingdom."23

While the imposition of martial law did put

a damper on some revolutionary activities when it was carried out
properly, governmental troops often abused its tenets to inflict revenge
upon their opponents.

It was said that "the commercial exchange of

Dublin formed a place of execution; even suspected rebels were every day
immolated as if convicted on the clearest evidence."24
Governmental forces quickly asserted their superiority on the
battlefield, despite the guerilla-like tactics of the Irish rebels.
After all, the Anglo-Irish government had a considerable military force
at its disposal that was designed to combat the rebels, maintain internal
order, and defend against possible French invasion forces.

With 4,600

regular cavalry, 2,600 regular infantry, 2,000 fencible cavalry, 1,800
fencible infantry, 25,000 militiamen, and 40,000 yeomen stationed in
Ireland in 1798 they simply out-numbered their opponents.25
also trained, clothed, and armed.

They were

Their only disadvantage was that many

of their members were not the most respectable or well educated Irishmen.
The yeomanry was a source of considerable trouble.

Because Ireland had

so many absentee landlords, this force was drawn largely from a class of
Irishmen who had little education or experience, and no family titles.
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During the insurrection, they rose in rank quickly and in "their new
charecters, they bustled and bravadoed; and sometimes from mere
ignorance, and sometimes in the certainty of party support or public
indemnity, they overleaped the bounds of law."26
i

Faced with a rebellion that was dying quickly, the United Irishmen
were both baffled and angered by the lack of response from their
"compatriots" in France.

After all, military and financial assistance

from the French had been a prerequisite

for the rebellion, they were

simply unaware of more recent political

developments in France.

Dispatches sent from Paris to Ireland in October 1797 had reaffirmed
French intentions following Bantry Bay.

The first of these messages

contained a renewal of the "former assurances of friendship and support
given by the Directory of the French Republick."

The second "announced

that the projected invasion of Ireland would be made in the month of
April 1798" to correspond with the native rebellion scheduled for May 23,
1798.27
Encouraged by such assurances, the

United Irishmen had few reasons

to doubt the sincerity of the French in
the rebellion.

the days beforethe outbreak

of

Naturally, the failure of the French to arrive in April

puzzled the United Irish leaders and promoted a sense of confusion and
indecision within the rebel organization.

In Paris, the first reports of

the fighting and the early rebel successes arrived in mid-June, 1798.
Those United Irishmen still in France immediately petitioned the French
Directory for aid to their fellow countrymen.28

On July 14, 1798, the

Directory finally issued a statement on the Irish situation that offered
the rebels little hope of assistance.

The French noted that although
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"the Irishmen who were fighting for all Europe were worthy of honour" and
"should be supported," the Directory was "very conscious how little
effective help could be sent."29
The foreign policy of France had undergone major revisions since
Ireland's receipt of the October 1797 dispatches.

These changes

reflected other alterations in the balance of internal political power in
France.

As leadership in the Directory changed from one group of men to

another and as General Napoleon Bonaparte gained more political clout
with each of his military victories, policy priorities were reassessed.
While in the past, the French had never demonstrated any real desire "to
send any force to Ireland, except such as, from its magnitude, might not
only give them the hopes of conquering the Kingdom, but of retaining it
afterwards as a French conquest," an invasion of Ireland had always
offered them the hope of destroying their enemy, Great Britain.30
However, by 1798, Ireland was no longer the only strategic possibility.
As a result, the Irish rebellion floundered without their much-needed
foreign assistance.
Since the fall of 1797, the military-strategic balance on the
European continent had shifted in France's favor, so that by 1798, France
was in the position to select both the time and place for the decisive
strike against Great Britain.

Their original plan focused solely upon a

full-scale invasion of Ireland in which they would make landings at
several points along the Irish coast to distract the British government
and to urge uprisings across the country.
put into action.

However, this plan was never

At the last minute, the Directory was advised by

Napoleon Bonaparte {now commander of the Army of England) and Talleyrand
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(successor to Delacroix as the Minister of Foreign Affairs) not to risk a
channel invasion.
suspended.31

Consequently, preparations for the mission were

Instead, with little consideration for the cause of Irish

independence, it was decided that Napoleon would lead the French Army of
the East on a massive invasion of Egypt.

This campaign sailed on May 19,

1798, just before the scheduled Irish rebellion was about to begin.

The

attack on Egypt was a move designed to threaten Britain's economic
resources in India and gain France an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan.
In reality, it did little to weaken England

and only reactivated the war

in the Mediterranean and opened the way for

a Second Coalition.32

Guided by the words of Napoleon and involved in the preparations for
the Egyptian campaign, "French officals ignored the strategic
possibilities inherent in a blow against British power in Ireland."33
With all attentions focused upon the actions in the Mediterranean, the
outbreak of the Irish revolt in May, 1798 was at first regarded by the
French as a minor incident.

Interested only in the military-strategic

balance of Europe, the French saw little need to support an internal
class struggle.

What very few officials in

realized was that a large-scale invasion of

the French government
Ireland would have been no

more costly than their ill-fated campaign in Egypt.

Only later did some

men acknowledge that Ireland could have proven to be a far greater threat
to Great Britain.

While it was unlikely that an Irish republic would

have been created, a long French occupation of Ireland would have
deprived England of many economic resources and would have given the
French Directory an excellent bargaining chip to use against their rival
in later negotiations.34

It appeared that Napoleon was to blame for
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such mistakes.

Many in Ireland believed that:

at no period in his life was Napoleon Bonaparte known
to favor a descent on Ireland. The cause of this
disinclination was believed to be because the
Executive Directory of the United Irishmen would
never agree that Ireland should become a dependency
of France. All their negotiations were based upon
the principle that Ireland was to be aided and
regarded as an ally, and when independent, and
recognized in that character, the French government
to be paid for whatever aid of men or money it should
have furnished.33
Upon the receipt of the news of the early victories of the Irish
rebels, the French Directory took a more active interest in the events of
Ireland.

In a June 20, 1798 meeting between Theobald Wolfe Tone (now the

official United Irish representative in Paris) and General Kilmaine
(Napoleon Bonaparte's replacement as commander of the Army of England),
it was explained that the French Directory was not anxious to invade
Ireland, particularly since Napoleon had left behind few available troops
or supplies for such a mission.36

However, after continued reports of

rebel successes and somewhat exaggerated tales of their strength, the
members of the Directory decided that France should at least encourage
the Irish rebels by sending munitions and a few thousand available
troops.

The French hoped that just their presence would provide "a

strong enough force.

. .to create a formidable revolutionary army by

adding disciplined striking power to numbers and enthusiasm."37
By mid-July, 1798, the French plans to invade Ireland and assist the
rebels were nearly finalized.

The Directory placed General Louis Cherin

in overall command of what would be three separate expeditions to Ireland
transporting a total of 8,000 French troops.

As it was planned, three

frigates under General Jean Joseph Humbert would sail from La Rochelle
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with 1,000 troops.

General Jean Hardy would follow him from Brest with

another 2,400 men on seven ships.

General Cherin would sail with the

remaining troops only after the other two had landed safely in Ireland.
However, problems doomed the French mission from its inception.

They

began when the government did not allot the necessary funds to supply the
expeditions until July 22, 1798 and the money never arrived.

After

several weeks and the transfer of General Cherin to the Army of Italy,
Humbert, with the smallest force, managed to secure enough money to start
the mission from the pay-master of La Rochelle.

He finally sailed from

that port on August 6, 1798.38
General Humbert, now second in command to Hardy of France's rag-tag
"l'araee d'lrlande" was advised to land his troops in Donegal, in a port
on Ireland's north-western shore.

Once he and his troops disembarked,

they were to surround themselves with Irishmen known for "their devotion
to liberty" and to set up provisional governments with civil and military
functions in those towns under French control.39

Instead, Humbert and

his troops reached Killala Bay (south of Donegal) by the middle of August
(see maps 3 & 4).

They sat off of the Irish coast for two days and

waited for a convienent time to disembark.

Humbert's three frigates were

spotted by British lookouts, who at first thought that they were English
ships.

A boat carrying five men was launched from the Irish coast to see

if these "English” ships needed supplies, but when neither boat nor men
returned, a call of alarm was issued.40

When the French finally

attempted to land on August 22, 1798, the Irish yeomanry was there to
stop them.

However, the French overwhelmed them in a minor skirmish and

went on to take control of the town of Killala.
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Once in command of the town, Humbert and his troops marched to the
Bishop's palace, took prisoners of the Bishop and his two sons and raised
the green flag of "Erin go Bragh" in a symbolic request to the local
Irishmen to join them in the fight against England.41

He then issued a

proclamation of French intentions that assured the Irish "that the French
came in the quality of allies, to deliver, and not to conquer
Ireland."42

Instead, the French sought to unite the men from both

nations and "march to glory," because, as Humbert stated, the French
"swear the most inviolable respect for your property, your laws, and all
your religious opinions; be free, be masters of your own country, we look
for no other conquest than that of your liberty, no other success than
yours."43
Despite such words of assurance, it was clear from the start that
the French intended to be in full command of all military operations in
Killala.

While they claimed to have come from France to bolster Irish

courage, share their dangers, and sacrifice their lives "in the sacred
cause of Liberty," in reality, the French saw themselves as a "Band of
Heroes," sent "to deliver you (Ireland) from the hands of Tyrants."44
More importantly, the French would be Ireland's mentors.

They would

"teach you (Ireland) the arts of war, and to despise the low pursuits of
toil and industry."

They would raise the Irish peasants from their lowly

social status to a new height where they too could "live on the spoils of
war and the labours of others."49
The French soon discovered that Killala was not the best choice for
their landing.

As part of the poorest province in Ireland (Connacht, see

maps 1 & 3), it was no surprise that Killala and the surrounding region
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of county Mayo were both unorganized and unprepared for rebellion.
Furthermore, because the United Irishmen had little to no following in
this rural, agricultural area of Ireland, few people had even heard much
news of the revolt raging in the east.

As part of a close-knit domestic

economy, the people of Killala lived simple existences as the tenants of
wealthy landowners.46
organization.

There was little time left for political

Rather, in most families "the men fed the family with

their labor in the field, and the women paid the rent by spinning."47
Uninformed and somewhat uninterested, it was no wonder that the
"immediate reaction of the country people to the French landing seems to
have been bafflement."48
While the Irish leaders of the rebellion hoped that the arrival of
the French upon Irish soil would add enough momentum to rekindle the
dying rebellion in the east, the early events in Killala offered them
little hope of success.

According to the agreements made in Paris, the

French brought the Irish their much-needed engineers, artillery men, and
officers, along with weapons and ammunition.
promised to provide the required man-power.

The United Irishmen
It was accepted by both

sides, that if the French supplied the field leadership and necessary
supplies, the Irish peasants would form the mass of the infantry.49

In

Paris, the United Irishmen had assured the French that upon their arrival
"instantly all the patriots capable of serving would hasten to the French
colours."50

Instead, once Humbert and his troops were in Ireland, they

found that only a few local United Irishmen and about 800 volunteers were
willing to leave their fields at harvest time and join them in revolt.
Most of the Irishmen that joined the French were a military
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liability.

These peasant "insurgents" needed to be fully armed, clothed

in uniform, and drilled.

With only a very limited time available to

them, the French could do little to educate the Irish in the use of
professional arms and had to accept their undisciplined behavior and
unreliable attitudes.51

The French were shocked by the poverty that

characterized the population of County Mayo (see map 3).

They were also

angered by the peasants' apparent laziness and general lack of enthusiasm
for the cause of Irish liberty.32

Bartholomew Teeling, Humbert's

aide-de-camp, remarked that "the country-people were very ill-behaved.
(They) came in, got arms and clothes, and ran away. . .their sole object
was plunder.

(We) shot two of them."53

common on both sides.

However, dissatisfaction was

Many of the more educated volunteers that fought

with the French expected to be treated with more respect and given a
greater share of responsibility.

They were "highly incensed at their new

Allies, who,. . .placed them in the front ranks, and made them bear the
whole brunt" of the fighting.34
While the French and their Irish partners desperately tried to
overcome their differences to create a united front of opposition to
British tyranny, many Anglo-Irish officials compared the crisis in
Ireland to the state of affairs in North America in the 1770s.
James Fox, leader of the opposition in Parliament,

Charles

had warned of the

seriousness of any Irish rebellion as early as March 1797.55

However,

once it began, both Irish and British officials hoped that the French
would not get involved.

While all agreed that "if the rebels should not

have the co-operation of a French army," the British could "put them
down" quite easily, "if the French should be able to throw a force of
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five thousand men on any part of our coasts, it would render the result
very dubious."56
Naturally, the August 30, 1798 news of the arrival of French
military forces on Irish soil was greeted by calls of alarm by those in
London.

Although British accounts of the landing of the estimated 800

Frenchmen referred to it as a "petty invasion of Killala," many officials
were worried nonetheless.57

The rebellion in Ireland was being

suppressed quickly and successfully by

the Anglo-Irish troops.

It was

feared that this off-hand attempt made

by the French to assisttheir

Irish comrades would only encourage new and more bloody insurrections all
across the Irish countryside.

They thought that "the enemy would be

presented as much more powerful than he really was" and that "a
confidence in French support," would "revive all the disorders which were
nearly cured in the sister kingdom."58
In spite of Ireland's substantial
Anglo-Irish government recognized that

military force, many in the
additional helpwas needed.

With

Humbert and his troops stationed in Killala, many feared that "unless
Great Britain poured an immense force into Ireland the country would be
lost."59

Not surprisingly, the British Parliament responded to such

requests promptly and sent additional troops.

The overall command was

transferred from the hands of General Gerard Lake to those of General
Charles Cornwallis.

While Lake was regarded as a "brave, cool, collected

man," he did not have the "resources adequate to the critical situation
in which he was placed."60

In a conflict that often demanded

guerilla-style tactics, a strong and decisive leader was needed.
Cornwallis was appointed to the dual role of Lord Lieutenant and
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Commander in Chief of the military forces.

As the replacement of both

Lord Camden and General Lake, he had control of Ireland's civil and
military affairs.61

The British recognized wisely "that the conspiracy

which was being carried on in Ireland had 'to be treated in a different
manner to an election mob or a drunken riot' in England."62
Meanwhile in Ireland, Humbert and his rag-tag group of Irish rebels
marched southward from Killala.

Their destination was Ireland's midland

and eastern counties, where they hoped to unite with the other more
organized and better supplied rebel forces.

After the successful capture

of Ballina (see maps 3 & 4), they marched onwards hurriedly in the hope
of capturing as much territory as possible before a meeting with a large
contingent of Anglo-Irish forces.

While Humbert and the rebels marched

from Ballina, 4,000 governmental troops under the command of Major
General John Hely-Hutchinson (the commander of the government forces of
the province) prepared to check the French at Castlebar (only 22 miles
away from Killala, see maps 3 & 4).

Hely-Hutchinson and his men were

waiting at Castlebar when Humbert's forces arrived.

They came on with

/

enough "skill and elan" to initially scatter the Anglo-Irish forces.
However, with Cornwallis and additional troops on the way, it was only a
matter of time until the Franco-Irish rebels would be permanently
defeated.63
In temporary control of Castlebar, Humbert and his men scrambled to
set up a new civil administration for the province of Connach and to
prepare for their next clash with the British forces.

Although they

desperately needed to raise recruits and supplies, there was little time
left, for Cornwallis in command of Ireland's Grand Army, assisted by the
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forces of General Lake were fast approaching northeastward from Tuam (see
map 4).

Trapped in Castlebar, by September 1, Humbert and his men were

on a quick retreat northwards into county Longford.

In their hurry they

left a considerable amount of artillery and ammunition behind, and relied
upon stolen horses for much of their transportation.

After eight days

and several encounters with the Anglo-Irish troops that left a reported
1500 rebels and Frenchmen dead, Humbert and his 96 officers and 748
privates finally surrendered to Cornwallis at Ballinamuch in County
Leitrum on September 9, 1798 (see maps 3 & 4).64

As General Humbert and

many of the French officers were led away as prisoners of the British
- government, the rebellion appeared to be over.
1798 was indeed a memorable year for the people of Ireland.

With

nearly 50,000 Irishmen dead, including many non-combatants, the rebellion
had ravaged or destroyed vast areas of Ireland's eastern, northern, and
southern counties.65

As the revolt that was designed by the United

Irishmen to lead to the creation of a fully independent republic, the
rebellion of 1798 came to a quick and disappointing end only several
months after it began with Humbert's surrender to the British at
Ballinamuch.

While events of 1798 demonstrated only too clearly the

incompetence and disorganization of the United Irish-French
"partnership,"

more importantly, the revolt had sharply illustrated to

the Anglo-Irish authorities that Protestant and Catholic Irishmen could
put aside their differences temporarily and assemble themselves into a
formidable anti-British coalition.

It remained to be decided in the

future whether the British authorities would award the Irish a new amount
of political and social respect, or whether they would punish the Irish
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for their efforts with more restrictions and fewer political rights than
ever before.
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CHAPTER IV
Aftermath

The dramatic surrender of General Jean Humbert and his men to
British General Cornwallis at Ballinamuck marked the symbolic end of the
United Irishmen's seven-year struggle to transform Ireland into a fully
independent republic.

For the United Irishmen and their fellow rebels,

the events of the three fateful months of 1798 were not only a great
disappointment, but an even larger disaster.

Because the rebellion of

1798 never gained the momentum or widespread support necessary to make it
a national rising, it was put down far faster and easier than anyone in
Ireland, France, or Great Britain ever expected.
Despite its quick defeat, the revolt of 1798 cannot be regarded as a
wholly unsuccessful episode in the histories of Ireland, France, or Great
Britain.

After all, it "was as stunning an event to contemporaries in

Ireland as 1789 had been to French men and women in France.1"

Although

the insurrection lasted for a relatively brief period of time, its
ramifications were felt for years to come in the future.

In 1798, "the

floor of organized society had collapsed" in Ireland, "and the
established classes had suddenly awoken to the existence of passions and
hatred which they had hitherto relegated comfortably to a primeval phase
in Britain's conquest of Ireland" a few hundred years earlier.2

76

77

Although General Humbert's squadron was not the last outside effort to
revive the dying Irish rebellion of 1798, it was the only one to make a
successful landing on the Irish coast.

Two other failed attempts

followed in the days after Humbert's surrender.

One week after the

decisive events of September 9, 1798, James Napper Tandy (a former United
Irish leader in exile) and his "Northern Army of Avengers," landed at
Rutland, a small island situated off the coast of Ireland's county
Donegal (see map 3).

Tandy as "Chef de Brigade" was accompanied aboard

the French ship "Anacreon" by French General Jean Pierre Antoine Rey and
60 other Irish exiles.3

Upon his arrival, Tandy anxiously "endeavoured,

but with little success, to persuade the Fishermen of Rutland that he and
his friends came to deliver them from their oppressors."4

To illustrate

his intentions and win the support of his fellow countrymen, he issued
two proclamations.

Not surprisingly, "the fishermen continued

unconvinced of their grievances, and the country people continued to hide
in the mountains."5

Discouraged by their lack of response and sobered

by the news of Humbert's fate, Tandy and his fellow exiles set sail the
following day (September 17) on a return voyage to Dunkirk.
Napper Tandy was not alone in his last-ditch efforts to assist the
Irish rebels.

On September 16, 1798 Admiral Jean Bapiste Francois

Bompard finally set sail from France with his squadron of six ships.
Originally intended to be part of the French invasion forces accompanying
General Humbert, Bompard, in command of the squadron overseen by General
Hardy, had been held in port for nearly two months.

Like Tandy, he was

completely unaware of Humbert's surrender to the British at Ballinamuck.
Therefore, it came as no surprise that Bompard's ship the "Hoche," with
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Theobald Volfe Tone aboard, was spotted and followed by a British ship
soon after its departure.

Following nearly a month of careful

surveilance, Bompard and his 6 frigates were captured in mid-October by
Sir J.B. Warren's squadron off Lough Swilly on Ireland's northwestern
coast (see map 3).6

In London and Dublin, news of the capture of the

"Hoche" was greeted with enthusiasm.

Loyalists in Britain and Ireland

were particularly pleased by reports that Theobald Wolfe Tone was among
those crew members taken prisoner by the British.

As "the ci-devant

agent of the Popish Committee, founder of the United Irishmen, and root
and source of all our (Ireland's) miseries for six years past,"7 it was
a relief to many to know that Tone would cause no further unrest.
For those few men who remained active members of the Society of
United Irishmen, the news of Tone’s capture and subsequent death was the
final blow to any hopes that still remained of reviving the dying
rebellion.

While Humbert's surrender to Cornwallis had splintered the

core of the organization and scattered what remained of its mass
following, the death of one of its principal leaders (Tone), marked the
unofficial end of the Society and its seven-year struggle for Irish
independence.

Despite any early military victories. The United Irishmen

and their rebel supporters were firmly and unquestionably defeated by the
Anglo-Irish forces.

As the disastrous culmination to nearly a decade of

careful planning and negotiating, "the fatal 'ninety-eight'," virtually
destroyed the Society of United Irishmen.8
With Humbert and his fellow French soldiers held as captives of the
British, the Anglo-Irish governments had regained control of the Irish
countryside and were taking decisive action to subdue further
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insurrections.

Not surprisingly, such events were catastrophic to the

Society of United Irishmen.

Although many members remained loyal to the

principles and ideologies of their organization, none of the principal
United Irish leaders remained active after 1798.

While many men,

(like

Wolfe Tone) met their deaths at the hands of the British, many others sat
in British or Irish prisons and waited uncertainly for news of their
fate.

Those men who remained free after the rebellion had wisely fled to

safety in the United States or on the Continent.

They hoped to avoid the

court martial and certain death that possibly awaited them in Ireland.9
For those United Irishmen who had been directly involved in
preparations for rebellion and negotiations with the French, the quick
defeat of the rebels was a stunning blow to the morale of the Society.
After all, the United Irishmen had acknowledged their needs for
leadership, ammunition, and financial assistance from the very beginning
and had gained the support of France to supply such shortcomings.

Those

men who organized the insurrection knew from their observations of events
in America and France that "in a grand revolution there must be a
division of labour."

While "there must be some to speak, some to write,

some to plan," there must also be "many to execute."10

The United

Irishmen completely misjudged both the ability and the willingness of the
great mass of their own people to rise against English social oppression
and political domination.

Although the United Irishmen had a sufficient

number of men to speak, write, and plan for their revolution, they lacked
the mass support of enough well-trained and ideologically devoted
Irishmen to carry out their intentions.
Those Irishmen who did participate actively in the rebellion lacked
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the advantages of education and military training that their leaders and
so many of the royalists possessed.

In most areas of Ireland, as the

French had painfully discovered, the Irish rebels lived "in a state of
total ignorance and beggary."11

While most Irishmen could understand

the basic reasons behind the calls to revolution, few could comprehend or
identify with the many important and more complex political ideologies
that formed the foundation of the rebellion.

The events at Killala, best

illustrated exactly how few rebels possessed the discipline and training
needed to defeat the organized ranks of the Anglo-Irish military forces.
While "their intrepidity was great, and their perserverance in the midst
of fire and slaughter truly astonishing,.
obviously.

. .on every occasion it was

. .not the leaders that spurred them into action."12

The

United Irishmen could incite the rebels into action with inflamatory
remarks about British oppression, but once on the battlefield, they could
neither control nor organize their fighting ranks.

While the rebels

fought fiercely because they were motivated by anger, it took only a few
defeats by the Anglo-Irish troops to convince them that it was time to
quit and leave the cause behind.13
While the Society of United Irishmen was nearly destroyed by the
rebellion of 1798, Humbert's surrender to Cornwallis publicly disgraced
the French.

Their humiliating defeat in Ireland was a great blow to

French national confidence.

When compounded by other disastrous defeats

in the Mediterranean and Egypt, the events in Ireland appeared to be a
prelude of events in the future.

By the end of 1798, Ireland had been

the destination of four failed French military expeditions.

While Banty

Bay could be overlooked as an isolated incident of 1796, the French could
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not deny the consective defeats or failures of Humbert, Tandy, and
Bompard.

Despite their own lack of foresight and improper planning, the

French generally reacted to the news of Humbert's surrender with anger
and disappointment.

Many Frenchmen, particularly members of Humbert's

defeated invasion forces, publicly denounced the Irish, their rebellion,
and most importantly, French involvement in such an unworthy foreign
cause.14
The defeat and capture of General Humbert was particularly
humiliating for the French.

Those Frenchmen who accompanied Humbert on

the invasion of Killala were astonished by the contrast between their
expectations and the reality of the Irish situation.

Many of the French

officers were accustomed to certain basic standards of living,
cleanliness, and education.

In western Ireland,

(and particularly the

region of County Mayo) the French were met by a peasant population of
semi-savages.13

The Irishmen were uninformed of the rebellion raging in

the east and its importance to the future of their nation.

Frustrated by

the apparently lazy and idle nature of the Irish, the French found
relatively few recruits willing to fight with them.

Many of the men who

landed at Killala, felt that "they had been completely deceived as to the
state of Ireland" by those United Irishmen in Paris.

Encouraged by the

reports of the early rebel successes, "They had expected to find the
people in open rebellion, or, at least,. . .organized for insurrection;
but to their dismay, they found only ragamuffins,.

. .who, in joining

their standard, did them infinitely more harm than good."16
In an effort to explain and justify their defeat, the French blamed
the leaders of the United Irishmen for their false assessments of
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Ireland's strength and dedication to the cause.

The United Irishmen did

after all, misjudge both the

quality and quantity of their rebel

supporters.

interest in an Irish invasion was motivated

However, French

entirely by military and political considerations.

From the start of

negotiations in 1793, the United Irishmen had stressed their desire to
create a totally independent republic through a large-scale rebellion
against England.

The French were willing to supply the Irish with the

needed men, munitions, and money, but they did so in the hopes of
destroying the British and retaining a strong influence upon Ireland.
Despite the inflamatory rhetoric that Humbert and Tandy used to try to
incite the Irish masses into

revolt, the French had little real interest

in promoting the political ideals ofliberty and justice.

Most French

officers involved, regarded the Irish with an unrestrained contempt.
They called the rebels "beggars, rascals, and savages" and "cursed
without scruple their own Directory, for sending them, after they
had,

. . .conquered the world, to be beaten in an Irish bog."

Many

Frenchmen agreed with those of their fellow countrymen who swore that
"they would never return to a country, where they could find neither
bread, wine, nor discipline; and where the people lived on roots,
whiskey, and lying."17
While the French suffered through the humiliating defeat of Humbert,
loyalists across Britain and Ireland heaved a sigh of relief over
Cornwallis' victory at Ballinamuck.

This appeared to be the dramatic

conclusion to a rebellion that had been the source of considerable fear
and concern for the Anglo-Irish governments, even though many small-scale
agrarian conflicts in the Irish countryside continued for the next
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several years.

The British government, Cornwallis, and Castlereagh (as

Lord Lieutanent and Chief Secretary of Ireland) faced the difficult task
of restoring peace and tranquility to a country torn apart by
insurrection.

Fearful of repercussions, Cornwallis and Castlereagh

wisely agreed upon a policy of '"firmness and leniency*” in Ireland.18
While many of the rebel leaders would be punished, they decided to pardon
those, "who had not been ringleaders in this rebellion; and who,
repenting of their folly, were desirous to return to their allegiance,
and to their peaceable duties."19
For those United Irish leaders who remained in state prisons, the
British passed the Banishment Act in the summer of 1798.

Agreed upon

after negotiations with the state prisoners, this act was a compromise
measure that offered something for both sides.

From among the imprisoned

United Irish leaders, several were selected to testify in front of a
Parliamentary committee on the activities and intentions of their
organization, as well as their connections with the French government.
In exchange for such information, the Anglo-Irish government would allow
them to emigrate to another country, freed from prosecution.20

Thomas

Addis Emmet, William MacNevin, and Arthur O'Connor were among those
prisoners chosen to testify before the secret committee.

Although their

testimony was complete, their departure from Ireland was delayed.

Many

United Irishs leaders were allowed to leave in early 1799, but those who
testified were detained for political reasons.

After they spent three

years in a Scottish prison, they were finally allowed to move to the
United States.21
Although many of those directly involved in the rebellion were
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pardoned or exiled, many other Irishmen were tried and convicted in the
state courts or before military tribunals.

Moderation prevailed in the

treatment of most rebels, but discipline was necessary if peace was to be
restored.
officials.

After all, the rebellion of 1798 frightened Anglo-Irish
While it was put down quite easily, this large-scale revolt

of Ireland's masses was exactly what the British had feared for
decades.22

Although it should have come as no surprise considering that

"nowhere else the British went,. . ,,did they treat the native
inhabitants so severely, exploit them so ruthlessly, and display such a
callous lack of concern for the results of their policies," the rebellion
greatly undermined the power of British authority in Ireland.23

The

Irish were theoretically fellow countrymen of the British, but they were
rarely accorded such respect.

It was "only the Irish use of force, of

violence so passionately strong as to threaten British ascendancy,"
during the rebellion of 1798 "that finally induced the. . .British to
reexamine their Irish policies."24
As the Irish people recovered from the tumultuous effects of
insurrection, the Anglo-Irish governments began plans for sweeping
political reforms in Ireland.

Later culminating in the Irish Act of

Union in 1801, these changes would give Irishmen greater political clout
and social responsibility within the larger British empire.

To

governmental officials in Britain and Ireland, the rebellion of 1798 had
only too clearly illustrated the desperate need for political and social
change in Ireland, if it was to remain an integral part of the British
Isles.
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